Tag Archives: Ahmadinejad

Iran Update

The AP reports that cell phone service has been cut in Tehran but is functioning in others parts of the country. On election day text messages were blocked throughout the country. The Mousavi campaign has used SMS extensively to rally its supporters. Pro-Mousavi websites are now blocked.

Several people have been injured in protests in the capital and one young man is reported killed. Police are suppressing what they say are unapproved mass gatherings. Reuters picked up this snippet of conversation:

“We are going to stay here. We are going to die here,” demonstrators shouted as one woman was struck on her back by policeman’s baton, while others were kicked.

“The time of dancing and shouting is over. They are going to break your leg if you stand here,” a senior policeman was heard telling one man.

Two things could radically shift the direction of events right now:

1. Election fraud: revelations of ballot box stuffing, Mousavi supporters being turned away from polling stations, or ballot miscounts.

2. Police brutality on the streets. Thirty years ago, the Islamic Revolution was fueled by tales of martyrs who died in street clashes with the SAVAK forces (the Shah’s brutal police service).

Themes of protest and individual sacrifice for common ideals run deep in Persian culture. An able propagandist might be able harness the immense dissatisfaction that Tehran residents are feeling right now and direct it toward a movement that could seriously unhinge the current regime. Such a movement would be fueled by the youth generation, who are too young to remember the repression that followed the Revolution and are unaffected by the horrors of the Iran-Iraq War. Their parents brought down the Shah without social networking sites and SMS, let’s see what they can do now.


Ahmadinejad v. Mousavi

Some interesting news coming out of Iran since Ahmadinejad’s surprising win yesterday.

The Grey Lady casts a lot of suspicion on the election results, describing voting anomalies and taking very seriously Mousavi’s claims of fraud.


And this description sounds just like Bush-Kerry 2004:

The emotional campaign was widely seen as a referendum on Mr. Ahmadinejad’s divisive policies. It pitted Mr. Moussavi, a former prime minister who has pledged to move Iran away from confrontation with the West, combat economic stagnation and expand women’s rights, against Mr. Ahmadinejad’s economic populism, social conservatism, and hard-line foreign policy. Many women, young people, intellectuals and members of the moderate clerical establishment backed Mr. Moussavi. Mr. Ahmadinejad drew passionate support from poor rural Iranians as well as conservatives.

Khameini made a point of not endorsing either candidate during the race, although he seemed more sympathetic to Ahmadinejad, and he has now given his blessing to the election results and discouraged protests. Nontheless, Mousavi is talking heavy:

“I personally strongly protest the many obvious violations and I’m warning I will not surrender to this dangerous charade. The result of such performance by some officials will jeopardise the pillars of the Islamic Republic and will establish tyranny.”

Al-Jazeera has this to say on Mousavi’s situation:

“He has been told by the country’s supreme leader that this is essentially the end of this election, and if he chooses to negate that command, he is laying down a challenge the like of which the Islamic Republic has reallly never seen before.”


Post-revolution Iran has certain scared cows, among them popular demonstrations and faith in its unique democratic system, and if Mousavi’s complaints continue to hold water or something improper is exposed in the election procedures, the popular outrage might be too much for Khameini’s words or Ahmadinejad’s storm troopers.

Related, 538.com published a piece on the maturation of Iranian democracy. Presidential races have tightened through the nineties, leading up to 2005’s run-off vote. This election seems to buck the trend, with the Ahmadinejad winning over 60% of the vote.